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Abstract 
 
This study analyses bank efficiency in Vietnam from 1999 to 2009. We use a unique data sample that 
allows us to capture the development of the Vietnamese banking sector over the last decade. We apply 
an advanced methodological approach introduced by Simar and Wilson (2007) to examine bank 
efficiency in Vietnam. An integral part of the analysis is to explore the determinants of bank efficiency. 
The results indicate that large and very large banks are more efficient than small and medium sized 
banks with small banks having the lowest efficiency scores in the system. We also argue that banks with 
large branch networks and those that have been in existence for a long time are less efficient than other 
banks.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Vietnam has become one of Asia's economic success stories in recent years with average economic 
growth of 7.8% per annum in the last decade.  The Vietnamese banking system plays a key role in the 
economic system. The banking system is a backbone of the Vietnamese economy and contributes 
about 16% to 18% towards annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Despite the relatively long transition 
process of the banking system, Vietnamese banks remain undercapitalized. The regulatory reforms are 
rather slow, which remain a problem for its further development (Dinh and Kleimeier, 2007).  
 
Efficiency at the unit level has become a contemporary major issue, due to the increasingly intense 
competition, globalisation, technological innovation and increased deregulation (Dietsch and Weill, 
2000; Molyneux and Williams, 2005; Alam, 2001; Bonin et al., 2005, Fries and Taci, 2005). Therefore it 
is important for banking regulators and market analysts to have sufficient relevant information that 
aids in the identification of actual or potential problems in the banking systems and individual banks. 
Such information is also valuable in order to compare competitiveness and efficiency of banking 
systems in Vietnam. If there is significant inefficiency in the sector, in general, and in different groups 
of banks, in particular, there may be room for structural changes, increased competition, mergers and 
acquisitions. 
 
There have been a few empirical studies that estimate bank efficiency in Vietnam see, for example, 
Nguyen, 2007; Nguyen and De Borger, 2008. We contribute to this empirical literature by using an 
extensive panel data set of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks during the period from 1999 to 2009. 
Such a large sample and relatively long period allow us to capture the changes over the financial crisis. 
No previous study of Vietnam uses such an extensive data set that covers both the pre and post crisis 
periods. 
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The objective of our study is threefold. First, we analyse bank efficiency in Vietnam by applying an 
advanced semi-parametric two stage method introduced by Simar and Wilson (2007) – no previous 
study of Vietnam has applied this superior method. Second, we identify the determinants of bank 
efficiency. Third, we provide a detailed analysis of bank efficiency for different ownership structures 
and bank size.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section details developments in the Vietnamese banking 
system in the period from 1986 to 2009 while section 3 provides a brief review of the previous 
empirical literature on bank efficiency. Section 4 focuses on methodology and data. Empirical results 
are presented in section 5 and section 6 provides a conclusion of the main findings. 
 
2. The Vietnamese banking system during 1986-2009 
 
From 1986 the Vietnamese banking system was transformed from a mono to two-tier banking system. 
The two-tier banking system has the State Bank of Vietnam as the central bank (tier 1) and four 
specialised state owned banks (tier 2). Order No. 218/CT dated 23rd July 1987 was the first decision on 
the State Bank of Vietnam operation mechanism and organisation apparatus, turning the State Bank of 
Vietnam's branches into public commercial banks. After that, the Council of Ministers promulgated the 
Decision No. 53/HDBT on 26th March 1988. The first round of the reform had been completed with the 
launching of new business accounting mechanisms. This reform linked banking change to inflation 
control. The state management of money, credit and banking services was clearly detached. The State 
Bank of Vietnam was only in charge of state management functions and all other banking institutes 
doing business. The function of the State Bank of Vietnam involved the monetary, credit and banking 
operation of the entire country so as to stabilise the value of the currency and promote economic 
growth. State owned banks became more independent and, in principle, bore responsibility for their 
profits and losses that were not transferred to the State Bank of Vietnam as before (Nguyen and 
Pham, 1994: 18 and Kousted et al., 2005: 12). On 1st October 1990, the Decree-Laws on the State Bank 
and Decree-Laws on Banks, Credit Operatives and Finance Companies came into force and was the 
second round of reform, which led to the first appearance of joint stock commercial banks, joint 
venture commercial banks and branches of foreign banks. 
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In Table 1, we show a dynamic growth of commercial banks in Vietnam. With extended networks in 
almost all provinces and larger cities, state owned commercial banks have a competitive edge in 
providing banking services. Although joint stock commercial banks increased their numbers 
immediately after their appearance in 1990 (in 2009 there were 37 joint stock commercial banks), the 
leading positions in the market still belong to state owned commercial banks. Three out of five state 
owned commercial banks accounted for 45% of customer deposits, 41% of total assets and 51% of 
customer loans of the banking system in 2009 (see Nguyen and Stewart, 2013). State owned 
commercial banks were originally sector departments under the State Bank of Vietnam, with specified 
lending programmes to state owned enterprises which were based on government policies.  
 
Non-state owned commercial banks consist of joint stock commercial banks, branches of foreign 
banks, joint venture commercial banks and foreign commercial banks1. Unlike state owned 
commercial banks a number of joint stock commercial banks make profits due to good performance. 
Joint stock commercial banks have achieved average returns on equity between 15% and 30% from 
1999 to 2009. Being less than 15 years old joint stock commercial banks are relatively young and they 
can be divided into three groups: (1) the top five large urban banks; (2) a smaller group of banks that 
are either growing rapidly or have established a niche; and (3) twelve small rural joint stock 
commercial banks. The top five urban banks are, Techcombank, Sacombank, VIBBank, Asia 
Commercial Bank, and East Asia Commercial Bank. The smaller urban joint stock commercial banks 
include, HabuBank, Viet A Bank and Saigon Bank. Small rural commercial banks were all transformed 
into city commercial banks at the end of 2010, such as, An Binh Bank, Saigon-Hanoi Bank, Petrolimex 
Group Bank, Dai A Bank, etc. These banks developed throughout the country, not just in rural areas, 
and with help from big business and foreign investors they also performed well in the 2000s. The 
number of branches of foreign banks increased from 18 banks in 1995 to 48 banks in 2009. However, 
each foreign bank normally has one branch in either Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City. Hence, their assets, 
loans and deposits are very small compared to state owned commercial banks, joint stock commercial 
banks and joint venture commercial banks. Despite Foreign Direct Investment in US dollar terms 
growing by a factor of eight between 1990 and 2005, foreign companies are still hesitant in deciding 
whether or not to choose domestic banks when they enter this new market. The number of joint 
                                                 
1
 Foreign commercial banks normally transformed out of branches of foreign banks. Data on assets, loans and deposits of branches of 
foreign banks are very small compared to other banks. Therefore, in our application non-state owned commercial banks consist of joint 
stock commercial banks, joint venture commercial banks and one foreign commercial bank.  
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venture commercial banks has increased slightly from four to six banks between 1995 and 2009. The 
first foreign commercial bank (being HSBC) had a license to set up a wholly foreign-owned bank from 
2008 (see Nguyen and Stewart, 2013). 
 
The credit growth rate of the banking system increased to 37.8% in 2007 and peaked at an alarming 
63% in the first quarter of 2008 (WB, 2008: 3). This has been the highest growth rate within the past 
decade. When the inflation rate and trade balance deficit had become more serious, the government 
applied a traditional tightening of monetary policy in order to reduce money supply circulation, which 
affected the banking system. Compulsory measures were necessary for banks to reorganise and 
strengthen their organisations.  
 
Table 2 shows data on loans, assets, deposits, capital and non-performing loans of the Vietnamese 
banking system (state owned commercial banks and non-state owned commercial banks) from 1999 
to 2009. On the whole, loans, assets, deposits and capital increased gradually over the period. 
Vietnamese banks were burdened by a high volume of non-performing loans, particularly during the 
1990s, however these generally decreased from 1999 to 2009. Non-performing loans of non-state 
owned commercial banks are typically lower than those of state owned commercial banks.  
 
In terms of regulation, the State Bank of Vietnam aims to create a banking supervision development 
(following Basel) from 2010 onwards. Meanwhile, the coverage, measures and procedures of banking 
supervision and monitoring are to be reformed in accordance with the development of internet 
technologies and banking technology. This will be done by applying key principles of international 
standards on banking supervision (Basel I and Basel II). The old capital adequacy ratio standards for 
banks in Basel I and Basel II are 8% and 12%, respectively. The capital adequacy ratio for the 
Vietnamese commercial banks is to be adjusted to 9% (as Circular No. 13/TT-NHNN dated 20th May 
2010 of the State Bank of Vietnam).  
 
3. Literature review 
Empirical research on bank efficiency in transition economies has been intensive in last decade.  Bonin 
et al. (2005) applied a stochastic frontier approach to analyse the effects of bank ownership on bank 
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efficiency and concluded that foreign banks are more cost-efficient than other banks. Fries and Taci 
(2005) also employed a stochastic frontier approach to investigate efficiency in 15 transition countries. 
They concluded that foreign banks show higher cost efficiency compared with domestic banks and 
that state-owned commercial banks exhibit the lowest efficiency among the group analysed. They 
stressed that cost efficiency of small- and medium- sized domestic banks differ significantly from 
foreign and state-owned banks. De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006) found that foreign banks have had a 
stabilising effect on total credit supply in Central and Eastern European countries.  Staikouras et al. 
(2008) analysed the cost efficiency by applying a stochastic frontier approach in six transition 
European countries over the period 1998-2003. They concluded that foreign banks and banks with 
higher foreign bank ownership involvement show higher efficiency.  
 
In Vietnam, after the transition in 1986 the empirical research on bank efficiency used a small 
unrepresentative number of banks and covered only a short time period. The problem of data 
collection made it difficult for researchers to investigate the issue through non-parametric methods. 
The research of Nguyen (2007) measured efficiency by employing data envelopment analysis (DEA). 
His research has been applied to a sample of only 13 banks in Vietnam over the period of 2001-2003. 
Nguyen and De Borger (2008) considered single bootstrap efficiency and the Malmquist Index for 15 
banks for the period of 2003-2006. No previous study has explicitly applied the double bootstrap 
method of Simar and Wilson (2007) on the Vietnamese banking system, our paper does. Vietnam’s 
economy in general and the banking system in particular faced difficult times in 2001 and 2008 (Global 
crisis). By restricting time spans, previous studies could not provide a comparative analysis of 
efficiency pre- and post- crisis. In contrast, our more extensive data set is available before and after 
the crisis (1999 – 2009) and therefore can assess the impact of the crisis on efficiency.  
 
In addition, the previous research on Vietnamese banking efficiency did not consider state owned 
commercial banks as dominant in the banking system. The efficiency scores of banks by type (state 
owned commercial banks and non-state owned commercial banks) and asset size (small, medium, 
large and very large banks) have not been previously considered, whereas we do. Further, it has been 
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suggested by various writers that researchers can adopt any measure of output for the financial firm 
as long as the measure is consistent with the researcher’s goal (Sealey and Lindley, 1977: 1252). 
Previous research on the Vietnamese banking system that has used core labour and deposits as inputs 
includes Nguyen (2007) and Nguyen and De Borger (2008). Nguyen (2007) employed the two outputs 
of interest and non-interest income and Nguyen and De Borger (2008) added consumer loans as an 
output. However, due to limited data, neither of these papers employed purchased funds data as an 
input or business loans data as an output, which we do. Our research is the first to estimate level of 
bank efficiency in Vietnam using all the required inputs and outputs as suggested by the 
intermediation approach (see Berger and Mester, 1997). 
 
Nguyen (2007) argued that the average cost efficiency of their sample of banks was about 60.6%, and 
the average annual growth of the Malmquist index2 was negative, being –2.2% over the study period. 
Conversely, total factor productivity increased by 5.7% between 2001 and 2003, while total factor 
productivity in 2003 was 15.1% higher than in 2002. This total factor productivity improvement was 
achieved primarily by greater technical efficiency and, to some extent, by technological advancement. 
He also argued that the technical efficiency of the Vietnamese banking system declined from 0.912 in 
2001 to 0.895 in 2002. Nguyen and De Borger (2008) found that the productivity of Vietnamese banks 
tended to decrease over their (small) sample period, except for the year 2005 – although the 
bootstrapping results indicate that the productivity change between 2004 and 2005 was not 
significant. However, neither Nguyen (2007) or Nguyen and De Borger (2008) considered the impacts 
of explanatory variables on the inputs and outputs, whereas we do. 
 
The Simar and Wilson (2007) DEA bootstrap procedure for estimating efficiency has been applied 
recently by, for example, Barros et al. (2008) and Brissimis et al. (2008). In the first stage, DEA is used 
to estimate the relative efficiency scores in the sample using, alternatively, constant returns to scale 
(Charnes et al., 1978) and variable returns to scale (Banker et al., 1984). In the second stage, the Simar 
and Wilson (2007) procedure is applied to bootstrap the DEA scores with a truncated regression. Using 
this approach enables us to obtain more reliable evidence compared to previous studies analysing 
bank efficiency (see Barros et al., 2008). Firstly, the true efficiency score is not observed directly, 
rather it is empirically estimated. Secondly, the empirical estimates of the efficiency frontier are 
                                                 
2
 The Malmquist index is an extension of DEA (see Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 1994). 
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obtained based on the chosen sample of banks, thereby ruling out some efficiency production 
possibilities not observed in the sample (Simar and Wilson, 2007). Thirdly, the DEA two-stage 
procedure also depends upon other explanatory variables, which are not taken into account in the 
first-stage efficiency estimation. This implies that the error term must be correlated with the second-
stage explanatory variables. Fourthly, the domain of the efficient score is restricted to the zero-one 
interval, which should be taken into account in the second-stage estimation stage. The method 
introduced by Simar and Wilson (2007) overcomes these difficulties by adopting a procedure based on 
a double bootstrap that enables consistent inference within models and explains efficiency scores 
while simultaneously producing confidence intervals  (Barros et al., 2008: 3-4). Therefore, bias-
corrected double bootstrap efficiency methods are preferred for inference (Simar and Wilson, 2007). 
 
Based on Simar and Wilson’s (2007) double bootstrap procedure, Barros et al. (2008) investigated 
commercial banks operating in thirteen EU countries between 1993 and 2003. They found that legal 
tradition and foreign ownership have implications for public policy. Competition can be enhanced by 
policies designed to increase foreign bank penetration. Further, location does not affect performance 
significantly. Instead efficiency is explained by bank size and the relative importance of a bank’s 
traditional activities. Brissimis et al. (2008) employed Simar and Wilson’s (2007) bootstrap procedure 
to examine 364 banks from ten newly acceded EU countries between 1994 and 2005. Their results 
indicate that both banking sector reform and competition exert a positive impact on bank efficiency, 
while the effect of reform on total factor productivity growth is significant only toward the end of the 
reform process. The effect of capital and credit risk on bank performance is in most cases negative, 
while it seems that higher liquid assets reduce efficiency.  
 
4. Methodology and data 
 
As discussed above we apply Simar and Wilson’s (2007) method in a two-stage procedure to estimate 
efficiency in the Vietnamese banking system. In the first stage, we adopt DEA to estimate the relative 
efficiency scores in the sample using, alternatively, constant returns to scale and variable returns to 
scale. In the second stage, we apply the Simar and Wilson (2007) procedure to bootstrap the DEA 
scores with a truncated bootstrapped regression. We use both Algorithms 1 and 2 of Simar and Wilson 
(2007), which are discussed in the Appendix. The bias-corrected Algorithm 2 is preferred and used for 
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inference (see Simar and Wilson, 2007). Explanatory variables (assets, non-performing loans, branch 
networks, the number of years since establishment and city banks) are also included in the second 
stage for estimation. Efficiency scores are investigated using asset size (small, medium, large and very 
large banks) and bank type (state owned commercial banks, joint stock commercial banks and joint 
venture commercial banks). We investigate, using the semi-parametric model of Simar and Wilson 
(2007), the level of efficiency of the Vietnamese banking system as a whole and for the sub-samples: 
state owned commercial banks and non-state owned commercial banks (joint stock commercial banks, 
joint venture commercial banks and foreign commercial banks). This is the first time that an extensive 
panel data set has been employed to examine efficiency in the Vietnamese banking system. Our data 
set includes 48 Vietnamese commercial banks over the period 1999 to 2009. We use the package FEAR 
developed by Simar and Wilson (2010a and 2010b) in the platform R to estimate the DEA scores and 
apply the truncated bootstrap models. 
 
4.1 Input and output specification 
 
There is no simple solution to the problem of input and output specification; reasonable arguments 
can be made for all approaches. There are two main approaches to the input and output specification 
of financial institutions, that is, the production approach and the intermediation approach see, for 
example, Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Matthews and Thompson, 2008. The production approach 
considers that banks produce accounts of various sizes by processing deposits and loans, incurring in 
capital and labour costs. Inputs are measured as operating costs and output is measured as number of 
deposits and loans accounts. The intermediation approach considers banks as transforming deposits 
and purchased funds into loans and other assets. Inputs are expressed as total operating costs plus 
interest costs and deposits while output is measured in money units.  
 
These two approaches have been applied in different ways depending on the availability of data and 
the purpose of the study. We assume that the Vietnamese banking system behaves as the transformer 
of deposits and purchased funds into customer loans and other loans. Therefore, we use the 
intermediation approach classified by Berger and Mester (1997). This choice is also due to the 
availability of data. All the data are indices of bank i in year t. Inputs are: (i) staff, measured by the 
number of employees; (ii) purchased funds are deposits from the State Bank of Vietnam and other 
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banks in the system; and (iii) customer deposits (or core deposits), which are described as total 
deposits from corporate and private customers. Outputs include: (i) customer loans, which are total 
loans for the corporate and private sectors; (ii) other loans: all other loans except customer loans; and 
(iii) securities, defined as investment and trading securities of the bank (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
Table 3 reports the characteristics of inputs and outputs. The first column lists the names of the 
variables while columns 2 to 6 reports various statistics including the mean, median, standard 
deviation, minimum value and maximum value.  
 
4.2 Bootstrap two-stage procedure 
 
In the first stage, the technical efficiency of banks is estimated, using DEA in order to establish which 
bank is the most efficient. Their rankings are based on productivity in the period 1999-2009. In the 
second stage, the Simar and Wilson (2007) procedure is used to bootstrap the DEA scores with a 
truncated bootstrapped regression (Barros et al., 2008).  
 
Stage 1 
 
Consider the jth bank with outputs and inputs Yrj, Xij (that are all positive) where Ur and Vi are the 
variable weights to be determined by the solution of the problem below (Charnes et al., 1978: 430). 
 
Max 






m
i
ii
s
r
rr
XV
YU
1
0,
1
0,
0  (1) 
 
Subject to: 
 
1
1
,
1
,





m
i
jii
s
r
jrr
XV
YU
; j = 1, 2,…, n (2) 
 
0, ir VU ; r = 1, 2, …, s; i = 1, 2, …, m 
 
The true efficiency score,  ̂ , is not observed directly, rather it is empirically estimated. Many studies 
have used a two-stage approach, where efficiency is estimated in the first stage, and then the 
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estimated efficiencies (or ratios of estimated efficiencies, Malmquist indices, and many others) are 
regressed on covariates (typically different from those used in the first stage) that are viewed as 
environmental variables (see Simar and Wilson, 2007 and Barros et al., 2008). Simar and Wilson (2007) 
criticised this two-stage method because the DEA efficiency estimates are biased and serially 
correlated, therefore invalidating conventional inferences in the second stage. Simar and Wilson 
(2007) proposed a procedure, based on a double bootstrap, which provides a confidence interval for 
the efficiency estimates and yields consistent inferences for factors explaining efficiency.  
 
Stage 2 
 
In this study, to implement the bootstrap procedure for DEA we assume that the original data is 
generated by a data generating process and that we are able to simulate this process by using a new 
(pseudo) data set that is drawn from the original data set (step 3.3 in Algorithm 2, which is discussed 
in the Appendix). We then re-estimate the DEA model with this new data (steps 4 and 5 in Algorithm 2 
– see the Appendix). By repeating this process 2000 times3 (step 2 in Algorithm 1 and step 6 in 
Algorithm 2 – see the Appendix) we are able to derive an empirical distribution of these bootstrap 
values (Balcombe et al., 2008: 1921). One hundred bootstrap replications are used to compute the 
bias-corrected estimates ti ,


   (step 3 in Algorithm 2 below)4. The efficiency scores,  ̂   , of bank i 
obtained in the first stage are regressed on explanatory variables in the second stage. However, these 
second-stage estimates are inconsistent and biased and a bootstrap procedure is needed to overcome 
this problem (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). The second stage regression is given by:  
 
iiti z  

,  (3) 
 
Or, equivalently: 
 
tititititititititi AGELNBRLNNLCLLNTALNCITYCOAROA ,,7,6,5,4,3,2,10, )()()()(  

 (4) 
 
                                                 
3
 This number of bootstrap replications is used to construct estimated confidence intervals in the two algorithms. Confidence-interval 
estimation is tantamount to estimating the tails of distributions, which necessarily requires more information. Hall (1986) suggested 
1,000 replications for estimating confidence intervals. We followed Simar and Wilson (2007) and use 2,000 replications in our 
simulations. More accurate estimates can be achieved with a larger number of replications. However, the calculation time also rises 
when number of replications increase (see Simar and Wilson, 2007: 44). 
4
 Simar and Wilson (2007: 44) found that 100 replications are sufficient to compute the bias-corrected estimates which require only 
computation of a mean and then a difference.  
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Where:  ̂    represents the efficiency score, estimated in stage 1, and the other independent variables 
are environmental covariates. When using Algorithm 2,  ̂    is replaced by ti ,


 . Following Berger and 
Mester (1997), we employ seven explanatory variables in the second stage to determine the factors 
explaining bank efficiencies. The two financial variables are: (1) profit before tax divided by total assets 
(ROA) and (2) total costs divided by total assets (COA). Five other characteristics of banks are also 
considered. CITY is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a bank is transformed from a rural 
commercial bank to a city commercial bank and zero otherwise. This variable aims to capture 
efficiency related to transforming banks. LN(TA) is the natural logarithm of total assets and LN(BR) is 
the natural logarithm of total branches and these provide information about the relationships 
between efficiency and assets as well as efficiency and branch networks, respectively. LN(AGE) is the 
natural logarithm of the number of years the bank existed before 2009. Lastly, LN(NLCL) is the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of non-performing loans to customer loans. More details of environmental 
variables can be found in Berger and Mester (1997). Summary statistics on these variables over our 
sample are presented in Table 4. 
 
Percentile bootstrap confidence intervals of the coefficients estimated in the second stage regression 
can be constructed as follows: 
 
   1)(Pr ,, jjj UpperLowerob  
 
 
where is some small value representing the probability of a Type I error (for example, 05.0  for a 
5% level of significance) and 10  . jLower ,  and jUpper ,  are calculated using the empirical 
intervals obtained from the bootstrap values, thus: 
 
  


1)(Pr * abob jj  
 
where 



  bUpper jj,  and 



  aLower jj, . 
 
4.3. Data 
 
We have collected a unique dataset for Vietnamese commercial banks. Our dataset includes 48 
Vietnamese commercial banks over the period 1999 to 2009. The data has been collected from the 
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State Bank of Vietnam and through the annual reports of individual banks. This data set accounts for 
more than 90% of total customer loans, total customer deposits and total assets. Five of the 48 banks 
are state owned commercial banks, five are joint venture commercial banks, one is a foreign 
commercial bank and the remaining 37 are joint stock commercial banks. Several banks established in 
2008 and 2009 are included in the data. The number of records each year ranged from a low of 17 
banks in 1999 to a high of 46 in 2009. Banks also have differing frequencies of years in the data, see 
Table 1. There are sixteen banks with data for all years; twelve banks with 4–8 years of data; fourteen 
banks with 5–7 years of data and five banks with 2–4 years of data (of which three banks were 
established in 2008 and one bank was founded in 2006). Only one bank (which was transformed from 
a branch of a foreign bank to a foreign commercial bank in 2008) has one year of data.  
5. Empirical results  
5.1. Efficiency scores 
 
In Table 5 we present our estimated efficiency scores. The top half of the table reports scores based 
upon constant returns to scale (CCR) and the lower half gives efficiency measures using variable 
returns to scale (BCC). The average initial technical efficiency score 




 
ti ,  for the whole system is 0.74 
assuming constant returns to scale and 0.81 assuming variable returns to scale. From these initial 
estimates, we apply both Algorithms 1 (to obtain *,ti ) and 2 









ti ,  using Simar and Wilson’s (2007) 
method. The two bootstrapping methods produce similar results. Simar and Wilson (2007) pointed out 
that Algorithm 2 involves only a small increase in computational burden over Algorithm 1 and that the 
improved performance of Algorithm 2 justifies its use. Results based on Monte Carlo simulation 
suggest that we should prefer the results from Algorithm 2 over those from Algorithm 1 (see Simar 
and Wilson, 2007). Hence, we favour these bias-corrected double bootstrap scores and use them for 
inference.  
 
The average double bootstrap technical efficiency score obtained from Algorithm 2 










ti ,  for the 
whole system is 0.68 assuming constant returns to scale (CCR) and 0.75 assuming variable returns to 
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scale (BCC). In 1999 efficiency scores for the whole system were the lowest for the period we cover, 
being 0.54 (CCR) and 0.58 (BCC). These scores steadily rose to 0.82 (CCR) and 0.90 (BCC) by 2009 
demonstrating a substantial increase in the efficiency of the banking system over the period – the 
peak scores are 0.83 for the CCR measure in 2007 and 0.90 for the BCC measure in 2009. From the 
column headed “Number of efficient banks” in Table 5 both CCR and BCC measures indicate that only 
one bank (being the Export Import Commercial Bank) out of a total of seventeen banks was on the 
efficient frontier in 1999. According to the CCR (BCC) efficiency measure 8 (21) out of 46 banks were 
on the efficient frontier in 2009. This confirms the general increase in banking efficiency over the 
period. The BCC score measures pure technical efficiency reflecting management skills and its average 
score is higher than for the CCR measure.5 On the other hand the CCR score measures overall technical 
efficiency (Gollani and Roll, 1989). The ratio of the CCR and BCC measures enables the estimation of 
scale efficiency that reflects both managerial skills and scale effects. 
 
Efficiency in the whole banking system did not unambiguously rise every year: the two exceptions 
being 2001–2002 and 2007–2008. Between 2001 and 2002 the CCR efficiency score remained 
unchanged at 0.59 (although the BCC measure rose from 0.64 to 0.67). Nguyen (2007) also found that 
Vietnamese banking efficiency did not rise in this period, indeed, his results indicated a decline from 
0.912 in 2001 to 0.895 in 2002. His results were based upon input and output data for thirteen 
commercial banks whereas our results are based on a much larger sample of 25 – 27 banks in this 
period. We therefore believe our results to be more reliable and infer that Nguyen (2007) exaggerates 
the decline in efficiency in this period. Nevertheless, we find that the number of banks on the efficient 
frontier fell from 4 (5) in 2001 to 0 (3) in 2002 according to the CCR (BCC) measure. We note that 
during this period of the development of the banking system there was a passage of banking reform in 
2002 which could have affected bank efficiency. Further, non-performing loans still accounted for 
7.06% of total loans in 2002 before sharply plummeting to 4.74% in 2003 (see SBV, 2005).  
 
The CCR (BCC) efficiency score fell from 0.83 (0.89) in 2007 to 0.80 (0.88) in 2008. Prior to 2006 the 
average growth of GDP was 7.8% per year. GDP growth was 8.5% and 6.2% in 2007 and 2008, 
respectively. The banking system had provided a great capital source for the economy, making up 
approximately 16% – 18% of GDP annually, which was almost equivalent to 50% of the total 
                                                 
5
 While the DEA CCR and BCC measures indicate some differences in efficiency patterns there is a clear general positive correlation 
between them, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
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investment capital of the whole country. However, the global financial crisis that began at the end of 
2007 and the beginning of 2008 appears to have had an impact on the efficiency scores. The banking 
system encountered many difficulties, resulting from a loss of balance in the source and use of funds, 
and the rapid increase in credit growth. Moreover, tightening monetary policy caused many banks to 
become weaker. After 2008, the Vietnamese economy, in parallel with the global economy, recovered 
and this is reflected in the 2009 efficiency scores. The CCR (BBC) score increases from 0.80 (0.88) in 
2008 to 0.82 (0.90) in 2009. 
 
Tables 6 and 7 report ti ,


  average efficiency scores categorised by asset size and bank type. In Table 6, 
total assets in 2009 are used to group banks into small (assets less than 20,000 billion Vietnamese 
Dong), medium (assets from 20,000 to 50,000 billion Vietnamese Dong), large (assets from 50,000 to 
100,000 billion Vietnamese Dong) and very large (assets more than 100,000 billion Vietnamese Dong) 
categories. The results indicate that large and very large banks are more efficient than small and 
medium banks because they generally have larger values of .  
 
Very large banks include the four biggest state owned commercial banks and two biggest joint stock 
commercial banks (namely the Asia Commercial Bank and Sacombank) in terms of customer loans, 
total assets and customer deposits. Large banks comprise the five big joint stock commercial banks: 
Techcombank, Export-Import Bank, Military Bank, Maritime Banks, and Vibbank. Medium banks 
contain the remaining state owned commercial banks, and the five other joint stock commercial 
banks. Small banks are all of the joint venture commercial banks and newly established banks. Large 
banks have the highest average CCR efficiency measure (being 0.73) throughout the 11 years. The CCR 
average efficiency score of very large banks (0.71) is lower than that of large banks but their BCC 
average score is much higher (being 0.86 compared to 0.78). Three banks in the very large group, 
including the Bank for Foreign Trade, Asia Commercial Bank and Sacombank, received awards from 
foreign organisations regarding their business. Small banks and medium sized banks have average 
efficiency scores that are similar (both are 0.65 according to the CCR measure and 0.70 and 0.71, 
respectively, for the BCC measure). Medium sized banks and large banks were strongly affected by the 
crisis in 2008 with their efficiency scores falling substantially between 2007 and 2008. The CCR (BCC) 
efficiency score of medium sized banks declined from 0.84 (0.93) in 2007 to 0.77 (0.88) in 2008 and 
ti ,



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0.75 (0.85) in 2009. Large bank CCR efficiency scores fell from 0.86 (0.94) to 0.80 (0.90) between 2007 
and 2008 although they recovered to 0.87 (0.95) in 2009. The crisis had a more modest impact on very 
large banks with CCR efficiency scores falling from 0.83 to 0.81 between 2007 and 2008 while the BCC 
measure remained unchanged at 0.94 during the same period. Small bank efficiency was not adversely 
affected by the crisis with the CCR measure unchanged at 0.81 between 2007 and 2008 and the BCC 
score rising from 0.85 to 0.87 in this period. Both small and very large banks efficiency scores rose 
(according to both measures) between 2008 and 2009. Small banks and medium sized banks generally 
have lower efficiency scores than large and very large banks. 
 
In Table 7 we present efficiency measures by bank type. It is evident that joint venture commercial 
banks have the highest average CCR score of 0.74 followed by state owned commercial banks with a 
score of 0.70 and joint stock commercial banks with a score of 0.67. However, state owned 
commercial banks have the highest average efficiency score according to the BCC measure, being 0.86, 
followed by joint venture commercial banks with a score of 0.77 and joint stock commercial banks 
with a score of 0.72. Joint stock commercial banks are by far the most numerous in the banking system 
and their average score seems to be affected by some small and inefficient banks. Non-state owned 
commercial banks (joint stock commercial banks, joint venture commercial banks and foreign 
commercial banks) have an average CCR (BCC) efficiency score of 0.72 (0.76), see the footnote of Table 
7, while the corresponding score for state owned commercial banks is 0.70 (0.86). This indicates that 
the state owned commercial banks have higher managerial skills (what BCC measures) if they are less 
efficient assuming overall technical efficiency (what CCR measures) compared with non-state owned 
commercial banks.  
 
In the first period where bank efficiency of the whole banking system did not rise (being 2001 – 2002) 
we find the following patterns by bank type. Joint stock commercial banks were the only bank type 
whose efficiency did not rise between 2001 and 2002, the CCR efficiency score fell from 0.57 in 2001 
to 0.55 in 2002 while the BCC score remained unchanged at 0.59 in this period. Hence, joint stock 
commercial banks are primarily responsible for the decline in the overall banking system’s efficiency at 
this time. Nevertheless, the efficiency scores of state owned commercial banks and joint venture 
commercial banks only rose gradually in this period, suggesting a more general malaise in efficiency at 
this time.  
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In the global financial crisis period of 2007 – 2008 there is clear evidence that the efficiency scores of 
joint stock commercial banks declined and some evidence, if ambiguous, that state owned commercial 
banks efficiency deteriorated. The CCR (BCC) efficiency scores of joint stock commercial banks declined 
sharply from 0.83 (0.90) to 0.78 (0.86) between 2007 and 2008. The CCR efficiency measure of state 
owned commercial banks fell from 0.87 in 2007 to 0.86 in 2008 whereas the BCC score rose from 0.98 
in 2007 to 1.00 in 2008. However, unlike the other two bank types the efficiency score for state owned 
commercial banks did not recover in 2009 with the CCR measure falling to 0.83 – the BCC measure 
remained unchanged at 1.00. This suggests that state owned commercial banks delayed recovery from 
the crisis was not due to weakness of managerial skills (BCC) rather it was because of their leading role 
in the economy of deposits and loans weakening. In contrast, joint venture commercial banks’ CCR 
(BCC) efficiency score dramatically increased from 0.75 (0.78) in 2007 to 0.89 (0.90) in 2008. These 
episodes confirm the general relative weakness of joint stock commercial banks in terms of efficiency. 
 
Table 8 shows the efficiency scores of each of the 48 Vietnamese banks averaged over the period 1999 
to 2009, assuming constant returns to scale (CCR), variable returns to scale (BCC) and scale efficiency. 
Only two joint stock commercial banks (being the TienPhong Bank and BaoViet Bank) and one foreign 
commercial bank (HSBC Vietnam) are on the efficient frontier (with an efficiency score of 1.00) during 
our sample period. It should be noted that TienPhong Bank and BaoViet Bank were both established in 
2008 while HSBC Vietnam transformed from a branch of a foreign bank to a foreign commercial bank 
in 2009. They performed well in the first years of operation after the financial crisis (at the end of 2007 
and beginning of 2008). While other longer established banks have been on the efficient frontier in 
some years their average scores are lower than those of the newly found banks. As discussed above, 
during the periods 2001–2002 and 2007–2008 almost all banks efficiency scores fell. While some 
banks are efficient in certain years the average scores over the whole period indicate that all banks are 
relatively inefficient (or have experienced periods of relative inefficiency).  
 
5.2. Regression results on environmental variables 
 
In this section, we regress the favoured DEA efficiency scores on our environmental variables (using 
the model specified in (4) except with ti ,


  as the dependent variable) and obtain the coefficients 
shown in the second (CCR) and third (BCC) columns of Table 9.  
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Regarding the control variables, profit before tax divided by total assets (ROA) has a positive and 
significant coefficient at the 5% level for both measures of efficiency. This implies that banks with a 
high ratio of profit over assets are likely to be more efficient than others. Total costs divided by total 
assets (COA) is not a significant determinant of efficiency for both the CCR and BCC measures. Thus, 
banks with relatively high costs are no more or less efficient than those with lower costs. Total assets 
(LNTA) and the variable that identifies institutions that transformed from rural to city commercial 
banks (CITY) both have a positive and significant coefficient in the regression for the CCR efficiency 
score, however, neither are significant determinants of the BCC efficiency score. Hence, raising total 
assets appears to be an effective tool for increasing overall technical bank efficiency (which CCR 
measures) if not managerial skills (which BCC measures). Further, the ten or so institutions that 
transformed from rural commercial banks to city commercial banks in the 2000s have also significantly 
raised overall technical bank efficiency if not managerial skills. The non-performing loans variable 
(LNNLCL) is an insignificant determinant of both measures of efficiency. In contrast, the number of 
branches (LNBR) and the number of years since establishment (LNAGE) both have negative and 
significant coefficients in the equations for both efficiency measures. This indicates that banks with a 
relatively small number of branch networks (such as joint venture commercial banks or newly 
established banks) and those that have been in existence for a comparatively short period of time are 
more efficient than older banks and those with larger branch networks. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The results of our analysis suggest that the average technical efficiency score for the whole 
Vietnamese banking system using the traditional method is 0.74 for the constant returns to scale 
measure and 0.81 with the variable returns to scale measure. These values are 0.68 and 0.75, 
respectively, after applying Simar and Wilson’s (2007) superior double bootstrap method. These more 
accurate estimates indicate a lower level of efficiency compared with the traditionally used method. 
We find that while bank efficiency generally rose over the period it did not increase every year, for 
example, between 2001 and 2002 as well as 2007 and 2008. For 2001 – 2002 our finding is consistent 
with the results obtained by Nguyen (2007) in the sense that overall efficiency (CCR) does not rise, 
although we do not observe the clear decline in efficiency that he identifies. We believe our inference 
is more accurate because it is based on a substantially larger sample of banks and a superior 
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estimation method. Between 2007 and 2008, a period that has not been examined previously, we find 
that efficiency declined according to both measures (CCR and BCC) and attribute this to the effect of 
the global financial crisis on the banking system.  
 
In terms of asset size, large and very large banks are, on average, more efficient than small and 
medium sized banks. Regarding bank type, joint venture commercial banks exhibit greater overall 
efficiency (CCR measure) than state owned commercial banks that, in turn, are more efficient than 
joint stock commercial banks. However, the ranking according to the BCC measure, which distils 
managerial skills, is that state owned commercial banks are the most efficient, followed by joint 
venture commercial banks and then joint stock commercial banks. Non-state owned commercial banks 
(being joint stock commercial banks, joint venture commercial banks and foreign commercial banks) 
are more efficient than state owned commercial banks assuming overall efficiency. The average BCC 
efficiency scores of state owned commercial banks (0.86) are higher than for non-state owned 
commercial banks (0.76) suggesting the former exhibit superior efficiency in terms of managerial skills. 
However, the average CCR efficiency measure of non-state owned commercial banks (0.72) is higher 
than that of state owned commercial banks (0.70) indicating that the former have, on average, greater 
overall technical efficiency than the latter. 
 
The Simar and Wilson (2007) double bootstrap efficiency scores  are then regressed on environmental 
variables to identify the main determinants of efficiency. Generally, banks with greater total assets 
and those that transformed from rural to city commercial banks significantly raise overall efficiency 
(the CCR measure), if they have no significant impact on managerial skills (the BCC measure). Banks 
with a greater ratio of profit before tax to total assets are significantly more efficient than those with a 
lower ratio for both efficiency measures. The number of branches and the number of years since 
establishment both have a negative and significant effect on (both measures of) efficiency. Hence, 
banks with fewer branch networks (such as joint venture commercial banks or newly established 
banks) and/or those that have been in existence for a shorter period of time are more efficient than 
other banks. The non-performing loans, costs divided by total assets and profit before tax divided by 
total assets variables are not significant determinants of either measure of efficiency.  
 
A number of policy implications arise out of this paper. The first policy implication concerns the small 
banks (in terms of asset size) in the system. The results indicate that large and very large banks are 
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more efficient than small and medium sized banks with small banks having the lowest efficiency scores 
in the system. This suggests that efficiency can be raised by restructuring the banking system to 
reduce the number of smaller, less efficient banks. Moreover, banks with large branch networks and 
those that have been in existence for a long time are less efficient than other banks. Hence, efficiency 
could be increased via merger and acquisitions. Therefore, the State Bank of Vietnam could consider 
implementing policies for restructuring the system and promoting competition in the banking sector 
of Vietnam. Our results also indicate that non-state owned commercial banks exhibit greater overall 
technical efficiency (based on the CCR measure) than state owned commercial banks. Thus, the State 
Bank of Vietnam could improve efficiency by considering policies to enhance the development of the 
non-state owned commercial banks in the system. 
 
We stress the limitations of our study. Although, we have set up a unique database, there is a 
possibility to collect data of the branches of foreign banks even though they account for only a small 
percentage of the banking system in terms of loans, deposits and assets. The full data might help us to 
provide more exact results of the efficiency scores. The next step should be to investigate bank 
efficiency of newly set up commercial banks and the “old” banks.  This considers not only ownership 
structure matters but also the differences in terms of bank efficiency between “new” and “old” banks. 
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Appendix  
 
 
I.I. Algorithm 1 
 
 
Step 1 Using original data of outputs, Yrj, and inputs, Xij, (that are all positive) compute DEA efficiency 
scores i

  
Step 2 Use the method of maximum likelihood to obtain an estimate 

  of β as well as an estimate 


of  in the truncated regression of i

  on zi (equation (3)) using m<n observations where 1
^
i .  
Step 3 Loop over the next three steps ([3.1]-[3.3]) 2000 times to obtain a set of bootstrap estimates
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[3.3] Use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the truncated regression of *i on zi, yielding 
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Step 4 Use bootstrap values in A (step 3) and the original estimates 
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,  to construct estimated 
confidence intervals for each element of β and for  .  
 
I.I. Algorithm 2 
 
 
Step 1 Using original data of outputs, Yrj, and inputs, Xij, (that are all positive) compute DEA efficiency 
scores i

 . 
Step 2 Use the method of maximum likelihood to obtain an estimate 

  of β as well as an estimate 

of  in the truncated regression of i

 on zi using m<n observations where 1
^
i .  
Step 3 Loop over the next four steps ([3.1]-[3.4]) 100 times to obtain a set of bootstrap estimates
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[3.3] Set )/(, *** iiiiii yyxx 

 for all i=1,2,...n. 
[3.4] Compute the new technical efficiency 
^
*
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Step 4 For each i=1,...,n, compute the bias corrected estimator i


 using bootstrap estimates in step 3.4 
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Step 5 Use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the truncated regression of i

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Step 6 Loop over the next three steps ([6.1]-[6.3]) 2000 times to obtain a set of bootstrap estimates
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Figure 1 Scatter plot of DEA-CCR and DEA-BCC efficiency scores 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 The number of commercial banks from 1990 to 2009
6
 
Type of banks 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
State owned commercial banks  4 4 5 5 5 
Non-state owned commercial banks      
                  Joint stock commercial banks  0 36 39 37 37 
                  Branches of foreign banks  0 18 26 31 48 
                  Joint venture commercial banks  0 4 5 5 6 
                  Foreign commercial banks  0 0 0 0 5 
Total 4 62 75 78 101 
Sources: Dufhues (2003: 32); SBV (2005, 2008, 2009) and VCSC (2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
6
 Beside these commercial banks, there are also the Social Policy Bank and Vietnam Development Bank which are operating as non-profit 
institutions. 
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Table 2. Data on loans, assets, deposits, capital and non-performing loans of the Vietnamese commercial banks (state 
owned commercial banks and non-state owned commercial banks) from 1999 to 2009 (Unit: 1,000 Vietnamese Dong) 
Year Bank type Loans Assets Deposits  Capital Non-performing 
loans 
1999 
 SOCBs     72,142,247      134,890,858       87,326,439       5,468,772  10.78% 
 Non-SOCBs     35,899,360        58,871,839       30,293,986       9,284,887  N/A 
2000 
 SOCBs   108,422,565      200,433,947     127,033,459       5,413,772  10.02% 
 Non-SOCBs     41,231,535        75,856,994       43,321,781     10,139,627  9.42% 
2001 
 SOCBs   135,647,621      247,151,769     160,738,302       5,421,134  8.83% 
 Non-SOCBs     45,466,715        88,614,974       51,759,565     10,953,034  7.81% 
2002 
 SOCBs   165,921,733      286,860,920     189,313,313     10,061,113  7.62% 
 Non-SOCBs     55,296,802      102,590,591       63,658,203     11,152,585  5.41% 
2003 
 SOCBs   214,481,096      367,813,825     237,485,761     14,516,916  5.13% 
 Non-SOCBs     74,068,790      130,337,981       79,255,399     12,398,334  3.57% 
2004 
 SOCBs   295,738,175      468,341,918     311,681,861     17,362,940  2.92% 
 Non-SOCBs   103,563,777      183,404,071     109,681,322     14,860,054  2.26% 
2005 
 SOCBs   380,850,503      603,540,889     406,957,181     18,429,980  3.81% 
 Non-SOCBs   143,449,737      261,307,537     144,499,838     20,009,805  1.42% 
2006 
 SOCBs   435,695,864      731,657,400     524,533,245     18,777,200  3.19% 
 Non-SOCBs   212,097,344      430,755,234     229,411,786     35,578,494  1.29% 
2007 
 SOCBs   564,677,195      904,004,852     652,913,108     30,091,997  1.87% 
 Non-SOCBs   420,184,441      903,961,807     456,920,152     66,066,418  0.94% 
2008 
 SOCBs   671,732,670   1,078,729,233     775,560,005     39,279,325  2.47% 
 Non-SOCBs   534,692,051   1,097,675,565     593,628,040   103,923,040  1.62% 
2009
7
 
 SOCBs   903,718,777   1,320,357,324     869,410,909     61,293,664  N/A 
 Non-SOCBs   560,883,667   1,210,244,318     680,665,451   115,192,318  N/A 
Note: SOCBs: State owned commercial banks; Non-SOCBs: Non-state owned commercial banks. Sources: SBV (2009); Financial statements 
of 48 Vietnamese commercial banks. 
 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of inputs and outputs (Units: 1,000 Vietnamese Dong except for Staff) 
 
Variables Mean Median Std deviation Minimum Maximum 
Inputs 
1. Staff (People) 
2. Purchased Funds 
3. Customer Deposits 
 
2,363.59 
4,717,463.63 
16,876,982.94 
 
485 
953,304 
2,801,850 
 
5,380.34 
9,114,539.41 
39,407,328.37 
 
31 
0 
796 
 
35,135 
65,317,125 
34,964,4191 
Outputs 
4. Customer Loans 
5. Other Loans 
6. Securities 
 
15,412,044.60 
5,603,227.19 
3,182,009.32 
 
2,642,000 
1,029,387 
189,737 
 
39,384,206.14 
11,005,779.19 
7,871,634.06 
 
496 
226 
0 
 
372,438,322 
72,637,734 
44,573,879 
Sources: Financial statements of 48 Vietnamese banks in the period of 1999-2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 We could not collect data of the North Asia Commercial Bank and Vinasiam Bank in 2009. 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics of regression variables 
Variables Mean Median Std deviation Minimum Maximum 
Raw data 
1. ROA 
2. COA 
 
 
0.01 
0.07 
 
0.01 
0.06 
 
0.02 
0.06 
 
-0.09 
0 
 
0.30 
1.24 
Other characteristics 
4. CITY  (Dummy) 
5. LNTA 
6. LNNLCL 
7. LNBR 
8. LNAGE 
 
0.18 
15.43 
-4.28 
3.27 
2.68 
 
0 
15.29 
-4.28 
3.22 
2.77 
 
0.39 
1.96 
1.14 
1.52 
0.48 
 
0 
8.57 
-8.81 
0 
0 
 
1 
20 
0 
7.74 
3.09 
Sources: Financial statements of 48 Vietnamese banks in the period of 1999-2009. 
 
 
Table 5: Technical efficiency average scores for the whole Vietnamese banking sector: 
^
,ti , 
*
,ti  and ti ,


  
 ^
,ti  
*
,ti  Algorithm 1, 
*
,ti  
Confidence interval 
ti ,


  Algorithm 2, ti ,


  
Confidence interval 
Number 
of banks 
Number of 
efficient banks 
CCR   Lower bound Upper bound  Lower bound Upper bound 
1999 0.58 0.52 0.48 0.64 0.54 0.46 0.63 17 1 
2000 0.66 0.55 0.50 0.67 0.56 0.47 0.66 22 1 
2001 0.67 0.59 0.57 0.68 0.59 0.56 0.67 25 4 
2002 0.66 0.56 0.52 0.67 0.59 0.52 0.66 27 0 
2003 0.68 0.60 0.55 0.69 0.60 0.52 0.68 28 2 
2004 0.75 0.67 0.62 0.77 0.68 0.61 0.77 39 2 
2005 0.78 0.70 0.66 0.82 0.72 0.66 0.81 41 4 
2006 0.80 0.73 0.70 0.86 0.76 0.68 0.85 41 7 
2007 0.87 0.78 0.76 0.92 0.83 0.75 0.91 44 9 
2008 0.86 0.77 0.74 0.90 0.80 0.72 0.90 46 8 
2009 0.87 0.79 0.76 0.92 0.82 0.75 0.92 46 8 
Mean 0.74 0.66 0.62 0.78 0.68 0.61 0.77 34.18 4.18 
 ^
,ti  
*
,ti  Algorithm 1, 
*
,ti  
Confidence interval 
ti ,


  Algorithm 2, ti ,


  
Confidence interval 
Number 
of banks 
Number of 
efficient banks 
BCC   Lower bound Upper bound  Lower bound Upper bound  
1999 0.65 0.56 0.50 0.68 0.58 0.50 0.67 17 1 
2000 0.68 0.59 0.54 0.71 0.60 0.51 0.70 22 2 
2001 0.72 0.64 0.62 0.73 0.64 0.61 0.72 25 5 
2002 0.72 0.64 0.60 0.75 0.67 0.60 0.74 27 3 
2003 0.75 0.68 0.63 0.77 0.68 0.60 0.76 28 4 
2004 0.84 0.76 0.72 0.87 0.77 0.71 0.87 39 5 
2005 0.87 0.77 0.72 0.88 0.78 0.72 0.87 41 8 
2006 0.89 0.80 0.77 0.90 0.83 0.75 0.89 41 10 
2007 0.93 0.84 0.82 0.94 0.89 0.81 0.93 44 18 
2008 0.92 0.83 0.82 0.95 0.88 0.80 0.95 46 13 
2009 0.95 0.87 0.83 0.96 0.90 0.83 0.96 46 21 
Mean 0.81 0.73 0.69 0.83 0.75 0.68 0.82 34.18 8.18 
Sources: Financial statements of 48 Vietnamese banks in the period of 1999-2009.
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Table 6 Technical efficiency scores as the double bootstrap method ( ti ,


 ) in terms of asset size in 2009 
   
 
Years 
Small banks 
(Asset: 0-20,000 
billion VND) 
Medium banks 
(Asset: 20,000-50,000 
billion VND) 
Large banks 
(Asset: 50,000-100,000 
billion VND) 
Very large banks 
(Asset: More than 100,000 
billion VND) 
CCR BCC CCR BCC CCR BCC CCR BCC 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
0.51 
0.49 
0.56 
0.55 
0.55 
0.66 
0.72 
0.73 
0.81 
0.81 
0.83 
0.52 
0.50 
0.57 
0.59 
0.64 
0.74 
0.74 
0.77 
0.85 
0.87 
0.89 
0.46 
0.49 
0.46 
0.50 
0.60 
0.68 
0.72 
0.83 
0.84 
0.77 
0.75 
0.47 
0.50 
0.47 
0.54 
0.65 
0.81 
0.80 
0.87 
0.93 
0.88 
0.85 
0.71 
0.76 
0.68 
0.62 
0.59 
0.70 
0.73 
0.75 
0.86 
0.80 
0.87 
0.71 
0.78 
0.71 
0.67 
0.62 
0.74 
0.78 
0.83 
0.94 
0.90 
0.95 
0.49 
0.58 
0.68 
0.73 
0.70 
0.69 
0.73 
0.77 
0.83 
0.81 
0.85 
0.63 
0.69 
0.82 
0.93 
0.86 
0.85 
0.89 
0.94 
0.94 
0.94 
0.99 
Mean 0.65 0.70 0.65 0.71 0.73 0.78 0.71 0.86 
 
Table 7 Technical efficiency scores as the double bootstrap method ( ti ,


 ) in terms of bank type 
 
 
Years 
State owned banks 
 
Joint stock banks 
 
Joint venture banks 
 
CCR BCC Banks CCR BCC Banks CCR BCC Banks 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
0.52 
0.51 
0.59 
0.63 
0.66 
0.68 
0.74 
0.84 
0.87 
0.86 
0.83 
0.64 
0.63 
0.73 
0.84 
0.83 
0.89 
0.94 
0.99 
0.98 
1.00 
1.00 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
0.54 
0.56 
0.57 
0.55 
0.57 
0.68 
0.71 
0.75 
0.83 
0.78 
0.80 
0.56 
0.58 
0.59 
0.59 
0.60 
0.75 
0.75 
0.80 
0.90 
0.86 
0.88 
10 
14 
16 
19 
20 
31 
32 
31 
34 
36 
37 
0.54 
0.69 
0.69 
0.71 
0.72 
0.68 
0.82 
0.77 
0.75 
0.89 
0.92 
0.55 
0.70 
0.71 
0.74 
0.79 
0.72 
0.85 
0.85 
0.78 
0.90 
0.92 
2 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Mean 0.70 0.86  0.67 0.72  0.74 0.77  
Note: In 2009, HSBC (foreign commercial bank) had average efficiency score of 1 for both CCR and BCC; Mean of non-state owned 
commercial banks (joint stock commercial banks, joint venture commercial banks and foreign commercial banks: CCR (0.72) and BCC (0.76); 
Sources: Financial statements of 48 Vietnamese banks in the period of 1999-2009. 
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Table 8 Technical efficiency average scores as the double bootstrap method ( ) for the Vietnamese banking 
system from 1999 to 2009 
ID Bank in groups DEA-CCR DEA-BCC DEA-Scale Index 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
 
48 
State Owned Commercial Banks (5 banks) 
Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development  
Bank for Investment and Development  
Mekong Housing Bank 
Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam 
Vietnam Bank for Industry and Trade 
Joint Stock Commercial Banks (37 banks)  
Asia Commercial Bank 
Saigon Thuong Tin Commercial Bank(*) 
Technological and Commercial Bank Vietnam 
Export Import Bank 
Military Commercial Bank 
Dong A Commercial Bank 
Saigon Commercial Joint Stock Bank(**)  
Vietnam International Commercial Bank(*)  
Hanoi Building Commercial JS Bank  
Maritime Commercial Bank 
South East Asia Commercial Bank(**)  
Vietnam Prosperity Commercial Bank 
Southern Commercial Bank 
Saigon Bank for Industry and Trade 
Orient Commercial Bank(*) 
North Asia Commercial Bank(**) 
Housing Development Commercial Bank(*)  
Nam A Commercial Bank(*) 
Vietnam Tin Nghia Commercial Bank(**)  
Gia Dinh Commercial Bank(**) 
Kien Long Commercial Bank(*)  
First Commercial Bank(***) 
An Binh Commercial Bank(**) 
Saigon-Hanoi Commercial Bank(**)  
Ocean Commercial Bank(**) 
Viet A Commercial Bank(*)  
Nam Viet Commercial Bank(**)   
Global Petro Commercial Bank(**) 
Petrolimex Group Commercial Bank(*)  
Great Trust Commercial Bank(**)  
Great Asia Commercial Bank(**)  
Western Commercial Bank(*) 
Mekong Development Bank(*) 
Lien Viet Bank (***Established in 2008)  
Tien Phong Bank (***Established in 2008) 
Vietnam Thuong Tin Bank(***Established in 2006)  
Bao Viet Bank(****Established  in 2008) 
Joint Venture Commercial Banks (5 banks)  
Indovina Bank 
Shinhanvina Bank(*)  
VID Public Bank 
Vinasiam Bank(*)  
Vietnam Russia Bank(**) 
Foreign Commercial Bank (1 bank)  
HSBC Vietnam(****Established  in 2009) 
 
0.57 
0.76 
0.66 
0.83 
0.69 
 
0.82 
0.63 
0.66 
0.79 
0.81 
0.54 
0.91 
0.58 
0.79 
0.73 
0.93 
0.56 
0.49 
0.61 
0.53 
0.87 
0.71 
0.52 
0.80 
0.75 
0.45 
0.88 
0.82 
0.71 
0.89 
0.61 
0.82 
0.81 
0.72 
0.64 
0.83 
0.76 
0.72 
0.94 
1.00 
0.88 
1.00 
 
0.80 
0.76 
0.67 
0.85 
0.67 
 
1.00 
 
0.86 
0.91 
0.76 
0.93 
0.86 
 
0.89 
0.75 
0.72 
0.84 
0.86 
0.63 
0.93 
0.66 
0.82 
0.78 
0.96 
0.62 
0.57 
0.67 
0.60 
0.90 
0.74 
0.56 
0.81 
0.78 
0.49 
0.88 
0.90 
0.76 
0.98 
0.66 
0.89 
0.90 
0.93 
0.70 
0.87 
0.79 
0.73 
0.94 
1.00 
0.90 
1.00 
 
0.81 
0.83 
0.68 
0.86 
0.79 
 
1.00 
 
0.65 
0.83 
0.87 
0.89 
0.79 
 
0.92 
0.83 
0.92 
0.92 
0.94 
0.87 
0.98 
0.90 
0.96 
0.94 
0.96 
0.91 
0.87 
0.93 
0.91 
0.96 
0.96 
0.93 
0.99 
0.95 
0.92 
0.99 
0.91 
0.94 
0.90 
0.93 
0.91 
0.91 
0.78 
0.91 
0.95 
0.96 
0.97 
0.99 
1.00 
0.97 
1.00 
 
0.98 
0.92 
0.98 
0.98 
0.83 
 
1.00 
Note: (*) Banks with data from 8 to 10 years; (**) Banks with data from 5 to 7 years; (***) Banks with data from 2 to 4 years; 
(****) Banks with data of only one year.   
ti ,



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Table 9 Determinants of CCR and BCC efficiency ( ) for the Vietnamese banking system  
 Overall technical 
efficiency (CCR) 
Pure technical 
efficiency (BCC) 
C -0.403* 
(-2.254) 
-0.824*** 
(-4.418) 
ROA 1.669** 
(2.082) 
1.712** 
(2.05) 
COA -0.467 
(-1.794) 
-0.348 
(-1.283) 
CITY 0.156*** 
(4.271) 
0.506 
(1.159) 
LNTA 0.079*** 
(6.467) 
0.164 
(1.129) 
LNNLCL -0.012 
(-0.996) 
-0.012 
(-0.928) 
LNBR -0.065*** 
(-4.277) 
-0.064*** 
(-4.012) 
LNAGE -0.096*** 
(-3.454) 
-0.083*** 
(-2.877) 
Observations 379 379 
Note: The variables’ coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) are reported in the table; *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level and * represents significance at the 10% level. Sources: Financial statements of 48 Vietnamese banks in the 
period of 1999-2009. 
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